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PRO SE LITIGATION IN THE SECOND

CIRCUIT
COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION*

I. BACKGROUND
This Article examines the ever exploding pro se docket within
the Southern, Eastern, Northern, and Western Districts of the federal courts of New York State.' Each of the district courts within
New York uses widely disparate procedures for handling pro se
cases with very little coordination among them.2 Consequently, pro
se litigants are able to exploit this lack of uniformity and coordination by filing the same or similar suits in different districts, and are
able to avoid the procedural requirements implemented in one district simply by suing in another. In order to make any meaningful
headway into this problem it is imperative that circuit-wide procedures be adopted for handling pro se cases.
Instead of confining the scope of this Article to suggestions for

finding increased numbers of attorneys willing to take assigned
* This Article is based upon the Report drafted by the Subcommittee on Pro Se Litigation, voted on by the Committee on Federal Courts of the New York State Bar Association,
and issued on October 8, 1987. The Subcommittee members are: Allithea E. Lango, Chair;
Steven Glickstein, Co-Chair; Thomas S. D'Antonio; Kenneth L. Gartner; Sharon Porcellio;
Stephen G. Schwarz; and John Stuart Smith. The opinions contained in this Article do not
constitute the official position of the New York State Bar Association unless and until
adopted by the House of Delegates.
1 Data for this Article was gathered through interviews with selected judges, pro se law
clerks, and court clerks in each of the four districts. The Article as originally drafted and
voted upon by the Committee on Federal Courts contained several "exhibits" appended
thereto. In reprinting the Article, the exhibits have not been included.
2 The variations among the districts may be explained by reference to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 83, which allows each district court considerable discretion in formulating
its own procedural rules. Rule 83 provides that:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from
time to time ... make and amend rules governing its practice[s] not inconsistent
with these rules ....
Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district
court shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the judicial council and the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts and be made available to the
public. In all cases not provided for by rule, the district judges and magistrates
may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
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cases, we will focus on ways of improving the courts' ability to
screen and consolidate cases, and to utilize available procedures
that will limit unnecessary processing of cases that either have
been incorrectly filed or should never have been filed in the first
place. This will leave judges within the circuit in a better position
to offer fewer cases to the practicing bar for assignment, and will
improve the possibility that the bar's efforts can be concentrated
on those cases which are truly meritorious.
A.

The Nature of the Problem

At present, the pro se docket constitutes about sixteen percent
of the total court dockets of the four districts in New York.' A
more disturbing statistic than the high number of pro se cases filed
in each district 4 is the "shelf-life" of such cases. Pro se cases generally remain on a judge's active docket longer than other categories
of cases, thus occupying a disproportionate amount of each judge's
time and attention. A limited survey of two district judges' active
dockets revealed that 169 non-pro se cases filed between 1975 and
1985 were still active. Those same two judges, however, had a total
of ninety-seven pro se cases pending of the same age. Thus, although pro se cases amounted to a relatively small percentage of
the initial filings before these judges, they accounted for a much
higher percentage of the cases that had been pending over a number of years on these judges' dockets.
By far the highest proportion of pro se cases are filed by inmates,5 and an alarming percentage of inmate cases are filed by
individuals with more than one pending action. Particularly in the
case of section 1983 claims,' it is not unusual for an inmate to have
cases pending in more than one district at any given time. Frequently, claims raised by inmates challenging the constitutionality
of correctional office practices are independently, but simultane' Pro se filings constitute a higher percentage of cases filed in the Western and Northern Disticts.
The greatest number of pro se cases are filed in the Southern District, where the
figures reach over 1,400 per year. See Memorandum from Marilyn T. Trautfield, Pro se
Staff Attorney, to Scott Etheridge, Personnel Specialist (July 10, 1986) (containing statistics
for Southern District on pro se filings from July 1, 1985 through June 30, 1986).
' For example, of the 1,711 pro se cases pending in the Southern District in September
1987, 1,155 were filed by inmates. Of the 1,155 inmate cases, 697 were section 1983 claims
asserting deprivation of civil rights while in prison. See Computer Summary of Pro Se Cases
for the Southern District of New York (Sept. 8, 1987).
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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ously, being raised in various actions in every district within New
York State. Unfortunately, no statistics are presently being kept
on this, and no procedures are in place to insure curtailment. One
of the highest priorities, therefore, is to develop mechanisms for
reducing the number of frivolous and/or repetitious prisoner cases.
At present, the standard section 1983 form complaint asks the
inmate: "Have you begun other lawsuits in state or federal court
dealing with the same facts involved in the action or otherwise involving your imprisonment?" The form then asks the inmate to
identify those cases, but inmates do not usually provide sufficient
information to assist in the weeding out of repetitious cases or the
consolidation of related actions.
Several improvements could be made to the standard form.
First, separate questions should be asked with respect to: (a) cases
involving the same or similar facts in state or federal court; and (b)
all other actions involving the inmate's imprisonment. This will assure quick recognition of related filings. Second, the question
should be reworded to ask, "Have you ever begun other lawsuits . . . , whether or not such a case is still pending?" This will
emphasize that dismissed or settled cases must be listed. Third,
the inmate should be required to set forth, as a prerequisite to filing, not only the name of each action the inmate has filed, but also
its docket number, the court in which the case is or was pending,
the relief sought, and the ultimate decision, if any. Failure to provide this information should result in mailing the form back to the
inmate with instructions on the deficiencies. An intentional failure
to list a previously filed case should result in sanctions, possibly
including dismissal.
Federal law allows states to establish an administrative exhaustion requirement in suits brought by prisoners filing section
1983 claims.' Under such law, the federal court in which the prisoner's case is filed is permitted to "continue" the action for a period of up to ninety days while the inmate pursues available administrative remedies. The continuance is authorized, however,
only if the state has filed with the Justice Department, and the
Justice Department has subsequently approved, formal administrative procedures that the minimum requirements set forth in the
statute. New York State has the second highest prison population
in the United States and the highest rate of filed prisoner com7 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1982).
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plaints, and yet has failed to exercise its prerogative to complete
application to the Justice Department." Such failure to develop approved administrative procedures marks a glaring weakness in the
continuing efforts to stem the increase in federal inmate filings.
More than ninety percent of all grievance appeals are completed within the ninety-day framework.9 Thus, there are no significant administrative barriers to developing an approved procedure.
Moreover, there is no sanction against the State for failing to resolve a claim within ninety days. The only penalty is that the stay
in the federal action is lifted. Thus, there appears to be no convincing reason why the Department of Correctional Services in
New York has failed to pursue a plan for approval.10
After prisoner actions, the next highest number of pro se cases
are social security claims. In recent years, the number of social security claims has increased significantly. To some extent, this
growth had been fostered by the Social Security Administration's
policy of "non-acquiescence" in Second Circuit precedent regarding social security disability cases. The consequence of non-acquiescence was that cases which should have been quickly resolved, or
perhaps not even litigated at all, were litigated all the way through
trial and appeal.
Although the Social Security Administration has renounced its
formal non-acquiescence policy, courts within the Second Circuit
have expressed continuing exasperation with the Agency's failure
to follow precedent. This has resulted in the issuance of injunctions against the federal government for failing to apply Second
Circuit precedent in its administrative decisions." Thus far, however, such has not appeared to have had a significant impact in
reducing the number of social security cases being litigated. Indeed, the Second Circuit has recently expressed doubt about the
' The application has been prepared by the New York Department of Correctional Services. However, each time it has been submitted it has subsequently been withdrawn.
' See Memorandum from Edward J. McSweeney, Assistant Director, Inmate Grievance
Program, to W. Merrill Sanderson, Office of Counsel (July 22, 1987); Memorandum from
Edward J. McSweeney, Assistant Director, Inmate Grievance Program, to Judith LaPook,
Deputy Commissioner and Counsel (Apr. 2, 1986).
'0 It is also significant that the New York State Department of Correctional Services'
previously withdrawn application treated only inmate grievances and not disciplinary matters. Since many more section 1983 cases brought by inmates deal with disciplinary matters
than with inmate grievances, any future application should include disciplinary matters as
well as grievance proceedings. Apparently, inclusion of disciplinary matters has never been
under consideration by the Department of Correctional Services.
" Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76, 81-85 (2d Cir. 1986).
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government's compliance with the injunction.1 2 Meanwhile, allegations of "de facto" non-acquiescence by the government continue
to be litigated. It is important that this issue be resolved as quickly
as possible.
B.

The Hodge Decision

The problem of obtaining counsel in pro se cases has been exacerbated by confusion over the intended scope of the Hodge v.
Police Officers decision. 13 Prior to Hodge, district court judges exercised wide latitude in determining whether to appoint counsel
for pro se litigants pursuant to section 1915(d) of title 28 of the
United States Code. Indeed, on its face, the section gives district
judges virtually unlimited discretion, stating only that "[t]he court
may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to
4
employ counsel.'
In Hodge, however, the Second Circuit held that while district
judges have "[b]road discretion" in determining whether to appoint counsel pursuant to section 1915(d), "that does not mean
that a court can do whatever it pleases.' 5 The court then articulated a number of factors to be used in determining whether counsel should be appointed. These factors include the probability of
success; the complexity of the legal and factual issues; and the
ability of the pro se litigant to conduct an investigation and present his or her case.'" The difficulty that has resulted in applying
these factors has been that, with the exception of probability of
success, in virtually all cases the articulated factors would tend to
favor the appointment of counsel. Moreover, the "colorability" of a
claim is already a factor to be considered in determining whether
to allow a pro se litigant to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset.' 7 Since there appears to be little, if any, difference in the language used to describe the standard needed to permit a litigant to
proceed in forma pauperis and that which would entitle the litigant to assigned counsel, Hodge could be construed to direct that
an attorney be appointed in virtually every case.
12

Hidalgo v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 294, 298-99 (2d Cir. 1987).

-3 802 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1986).
1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982).
16

Hodge, 802 F.2d at 60.
Id. at 60-61.

'7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982) ("[tlhe court ...
may dismiss the [in forma pauperis
action] ... if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious").
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We do not believe that the Second Circuit intended such a
result. As the Second Circuit itself recognized, "[i]f mere bald assertions by an indigent, which technically put a fact in issue and
suffice to avert summary judgment, required appointment of an attorney under section 1915(d), the demand for such representation
could be overwhelming."'" However, the Second Circuit's use of inconsistent language to articulate the level of success which must be
found before appointment is required has generated some confusion in the lower courts. Obviously, there is much leeway between
"some chance of success,"' 9 which would seem to require appointment of counsel in most cases, and "likely to be of substance,"2
which implies a higher threshold.
Because decisions regarding the appointment of counsel are
rarely published, there has been little opportunity to clarify the
Hodge decision. Our informal survey indicates that although some
judges since Hodge have leaned heavily toward significantly increased appointments, most judges view Hodge as codifying their
pre-existing practice and continue to appoint counsel only where
an individualized assessment suggests that an apparently legitimate case cannot proceed without the assistance of an attorney.
We believe that more published decisions explaining the reasons
for appointing or declining to appoint counsel would result in reducing the confusion and uncertainty which Hodge has generated,
particularly those decisions declining to appoint, since they present
the opportunity for appellate review and clarification by the Second Circuit.2 '
C. Attorney's Fees and Costs
The willingness of counsel to volunteer for assignments is influenced by the availability of fees and the potential for recovery of
costs. Of the pro se cases filed, attorneys are most easily secured
for those cases where fees are most probably available.
Three types of Social Security benefits are litigated in federal
" Hodge, 802 F.2d at 60.
"9Id. at 60-61.
'0 Id. at 61.
1 In that connection, the Second Circuit has recently confirmed that a decision to deny
appointment is not appealable as an interlocutory order, Welch v. Smith, 810 F.2d 40, 42
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 246 (1987), and that upon ultimate appellate review a
decision to deny appointment will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Pena v.
Choo, 826 F.2d 168, 168 (2d Cir. 1987).
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courts: old age benefits; supplemental security income (commonly
called "disability benefits"); and Medicare benefits. A statutorily
created contingent fee of up to twenty-five percent of the award
exists for old age and Medicare cases.22 There is no similar provision in disability cases and, for a while, it was uncertain whether
attorney's fees could be awarded in such cases. However, with the
enactment of sections 2412(b) and 2412(d)(1) of title 28 of the
United States Code-authorizing fees in most suits against the
government and mandating fees where the government's position
is not "substantially justified" 2 -the decisions now permit attorney's fees in disability cases.2 4
It would be desirable, however, for courts to also allow pro se
litigants to consent beforehand to a twenty-five percent contingent
fee. This would provide a greater incentive for the attorney to take
the case, since it would allow the attorney to obtain the twenty-five
percent contingent fee or the amount provided by statute, whichever is greater. In the event the contingent fee was higher than the
amount provided by statute, the pro se litigant should be entitled
to the statutory fees awarded, thus reducing the severity of the
contingent fee.
Similar provisions for attorney's fees could also be made in
civil rights actions, particularly section 1983 claims, and EEOC
cases. At present, the court in such cases has discretion to award
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party.2 5 However, there
is no reason why pro se litigants in such cases should not also be
empowered to authorize a twenty-five percent contingent fee in circumstances where the contingent fee exceeds the statutory fee. As
previously indicated, allowing such contingent fees might encourage more attorneys to volunteer for such cases.
22

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (1982) (old age); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)

(medicare).
23 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
24

See, e.g., Fleming v. Bowen, 637 F. Supp. 726, 730-31 (D.D.C. 1986) (governmental

agency's denial of plaintiff's disability claims was not supported by "substantial evidence");
Soto-Valentin v. Heckler, 619 F. Supp. 627, 630-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (the law as to applicable
standard in plaintiff's case was settled before that motion was litigated).
2"

cases).

See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (civil rights cases); 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(k) (1982) (EEOC
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PROCEDURES PRESENTLY IN USE IN FEDERAL COURTS IN NEW
YORK

A.

Southern District

Recently, in the Southern District, a new process for handling
the pro se docket has been implemented. 26 Under the new procedures, the pro se law clerks and their staffs, before considering the
possible appointment of counsel, review the subject matter of each
complaint as presented for filing. A computer check is then run in
which the names of all the parties to the pro se matter are compared with those in pending cases in order to ascertain if the case
constitutes a repetitious filing. Similarly, the complaint is compared with pending individual actions within the district and with
pending class actions throughout the Second Circuit.2"
The pro se law clerk then forwards the case file to the judge
assigned 28 with a written recommendation with regard to in forma
pauperis status, attorney assignment, the underlying merits, and
possible consolidation. The law clerk then summarizes the subject
matter of each case for circulation to all firms on the pro bono
panel with a request that each firm select cases on a regular basis
from that panel.2 9
In the Southern District, a pro se case is left pending decision
for an average of only twenty-seven days. This very efficient handling of cases is apparently due in large part to the relatively frequent use of summary dismissals.30 Such reveals that an initial re26 In the Southern District, the pro se docket is monitored by a pro se committee currently chaired by Judge Robert W. Sweet. All pro se cases are computer stored, and case
status information is updated on a monthly basis.
27 As of yet, the process is not infallible and needs further standardization and revision,
especially with respect to information sources for repetitious filings.
28 Judge assignments reflect an effort to group similar subject matters and identical

parties.
29 At the time assignment is accepted, the plaintiff is required to sign a limited waiver
of attorney-client privilege should counsel for any reason seek to be relieved. This waiver
permits counsel to disclose in camera his or her reasons for seeking to withdraw from a case,
presumably making withdrawal easier and hence eliminating a barrier to acceptance of pro
se cases.
30 Summary dismissal in the Southern District describes the process by which a pro se
complaint is scrutinized before issue has been joined. The Chief Judge issues a dismissal
order for a variety of reasons that may include impropriety of the pleadings, a total failure
to state a claim, or an absence of subject matter jurisdiction. In nearly every instance, the
dismissal is without prejudice to a later and proper filing. Court records indicate that of the
roughly 1,500 cases filed in the twelve months preceding July 1987, 644 of those filings were
summarily dismissed. More than one-third of those dismissals were appealed and, as of July
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view of the complaint can provide a significant reduction in the
court's docket.
Finally, the pro se office of the Southern District provides an
important community service in distributing information and assisting pro se litigants. For example, at the time of every filing,
each litigant is provided with a copy of the Federal Civil Litigation
Handbook, prepared by Maryellen Fullerton, Professor of Law at
Brooklyn Law School. The publication was undertaken with the
support and direction of the Southern District Pro Se Committee.
This type of information, and the very visible proffile of the pro se
office not only assists litigants, but the consequently improved
practices ultimately relieve the ever increasing burden of pro se
litigation upon the judges and their staffs.
B. Eastern,Northern, and Western Districts
Unlike the Southern District, no subject matter review or comparison of cases is done by the pro se law clerks in the Eastern,
Northern, or Western Districts. Nor is a computer check made on
prior filed actions by party plaintiffs, although the Eastern District
guidelines provide for a manual check. The complaints are merely
reviewed for technical sufficiency and forwarded to the assigned
judge with remarks on the necessity of assigned counsel. In some
instances, judges then request assigned counsel. Such assignments
are made on a random basis. Unlike the Southern District, no subject matter summary is provided to assigned counsel. The case file
is simply forwarded to an attorney on an active pro bono list with
the hope that it will not be returned.
Like the Southern District, the Eastern District has developed
a Civil Pro Bono Panel consisting of attorneys who have indicated
a willingness to serve as appointed counsel.3 1 Neither the Northern
nor the Western Districts have published guidelines for handling
pro se cases or for appointing counsel. The Eastern District s2 has
established the Eastern District Civil Litigation Fund, Inc., which
is designed to help defray expenses of assigned counsel who could
not otherwise handle pro bono matters. Assigned attorneys may
1987, none of those appealed dismissals were reversed.
" The Eastern District also permits, although it does not require, pro se litigants to
sign limited waivers of attorney-client privilege to assist in applications to be relieved.
32 Recently, the Eastern District was the subject of an extensive report by Professor
Milton Human, which among other things, described in detail the efforts made to address
the logistics of pro se litigation. The report is extremely informative.
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apply for expenses of up to two hundred dollars and, in unusual
cases, for more than that amount.
The Northern District has adopted a partial filing fee rule,
which has reduced the subsequent number of pro se filings by over
thirty-eight percent.3 3 Such fees, which have the effect of deterring
frivolous litigation, have been found acceptable by courts in other
circuits. 4 However, since the imposition of the Northern District's
filing fee, the other three districts still operating without such a fee
are receiving filings from inmates located within the Northern District. These papers are being filed without payment and are then
transferred to the Northern District. The result is that some
Northern District litigants are successfully avoiding the partial filing fee. Moreover, the differing treatment being afforded plaintiffs
within and without the Northern District leaves open the possible
equal protection challenge to the filing fee practice. Inmates
throughout the New York State Department of Correctional Services are being treated differently depending solely upon their geographic location.

III.
A.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Reducing the Number of Cases Needing Assigned Counsel

Although there is an obvious and ever-present need to provide
the court and litigants with available counsel to accept assigned
cases, there is also a need to reduce repetitious and spurious filings
in a consistent manner throughout the Second Circuit. We recommend standardization of procedures and extensive sharing of information among the districts within the circuit. This effort should be
spearheaded by the Circuit Executive and the clerks of the various
courts including, of course, the pro se clerks.
Court clerk employees faced with pro se matters should be
permitted to develop an exclusive pro se identity within each
clerk's office. Emphasis should be placed upon inter-district data
sharing, regular meetings to improve pro bono practices, and up33 Each pro se prisoner litigant must pay an amount equal to ten percent of deposits
received in his or her inmate account over the previous three months. This is verified by a
certified statement of account. The average filing fee ranges from eight to ten dollars.
34 See, e.g., In re Williamson, 786 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 (8th Cir. 1986); Bullock v.
Suomela, 710 F.2d 102, 103 (3d Cir. 1983); Smith v. Martinez, 706 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir.
1983); Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d 521, 525 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982);
In re Stump, 449 F.2d 1297, 1298 (1st Cir. 1971).
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dated case information on substantive and procedural issues.
Presenting a unified system will not only reduce repetitious
filings, but will provide a forum for constant system improvement.
As pro se law clerks come and go within each district, both satisfactory and unsatisfactory practices fall in and out of use. A standardized system of coping with the large number of pro se filings
will obviously increase efficiency and overall reduce pending cases.
In order to accomplish improved circuit-wide practice with respect to pro se filings, the following is recommended:
1. Reduce Frivolous, Repetitious, or Unnecessary Filings:
a. Impose a partial filing fee in all districts;
b. Require pro se plaintiffs to identify not only their pending
litigation, but also all of their prior filings; failure to provide requested details about other cases should result in mailing the
complaint back to the pro se litigant with an explanation of the
deficiencies; failure to list a case entirely should result in sanctions, including possible dismissal;
c. Computerize on a circuit-wide basis information on all pro
se filings in order to check for related cases filed by other litigants
and to verify the accuracy of the case listings provided by the
particular pro se plaintiff; this computer check should be completed before in forma pauperis status is granted;
d. Direct judges to consolidate cases filed by a single plaintiff
or involving similar subject matter;
e. Establish procedures for summary dismissal before joinder
of issue;
f. Urge the New York Department of Correctional Services
and the New York Attorney General to submit to the Department
of Justice a procedure for prompt review of section 1983 claims
filed by prisoners in order to impose an administrative exhaustion
requirement; such an exhaustion procedure should encompass
disciplinary claims as well as grievance claims;
g. Impose stiff sanctions in cases where the government continues to litigate in contravention of established case law.
2. Clarify the Hodge Decision:
a. Clarify the bases for the Hodge decision through the
broader dissemination of written opinions and ultimate review by
the Second Circuit; confirm that the threshold standard for considering appointment of counsel is that the claim is "likely to be
of substance," not merely that it have "some chance of success."35
"I Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1986).
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B. Increasing the Number of Attorneys Willing to Accept
Assignments
In addition to measures taken to reduce the number of cases
needing assigned counsel, steps can be taken to increase the number of attorneys available to handle such matters. The following is
recommended:
1. Adopt Procedures which Make it Easier for Attorneys to Accept, Handle, and Withdraw from Assigned Cases:
a. Develop a civil pro bono panel in all districts; establish an
ongoing program to recruit additional members to the panel;
b. Require applicants for assigned counsel to execute limited
waivers of attorney-client privilege in the event assigned counsel
later wishes to file an in camera application to be relieved;
c. Require that all applications by assigned counsel to be relieved be filed with and heard by a judge not assigned to the case,
so as not to prejudice the client;
d. Prepare and disseminate summaries of cases available for
assignment in order to assist counsel in the selection of the most
meritorious cases;
e. Adopt uniform standing orders which routinely permit
non-stenographic recordings and/or telephonic depositions in order to reduce expenses.
2. Provide for Greater Availability of Attorney's Fees and Costs
to Assigned Counsel:
a. Award attorney's fees to assigned counsel as a matter of
course in cases where such fees are authorized by statute, unless
compelling reasons exist to deny the fee application;
b. Permit applicants for assigned counsel to consent to a
twenty-five percent contingent fee regardless of the type of case;
permit assigned counsel to keep the greater of the statutory
award or the contingent fee (with the statutory award being assigned to the client in the event the contingent fee is higher) and
eliminate any requirement that attorney's fees be deducted from
the award in social security cases;
c. Establish funds like the Eastern District Fund in each district to help defray disbursements for those attorneys unable to
bear such expenses.
C. Assisting the Pro Se Litigant
Providing additional information and assistance to pro se litigants can result in a decrease in the number of papers filed with
technical deficiencies and in the more expeditious processing of
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cases. The following is recommended:
1. Provide full-time pro se clerks who can provide technical assistance to, and answer questions from, pro se litigants; such personnel should not be asked to divide their time with non-pro se
tasks.
2. Distribute literature, such as the Federal Civil Litigation
Handbook used by the Southern District, which provides practical information to pro se litigants concerning the handling of
their cases.
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